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Measuring Switching Costs and Their Determinants in Internet-Enabled Businesses: 
A Study of the Online Brokerage Industry 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The ability to retain and lock-in customers in the face of competition is a major concern for 
online businesses, especially those that invest heavily in advertising and customer acquisition. 
In this paper, we develop and implement an approach for measuring the magnitude of 
switching costs and brand loyalty for online service providers based on the random utility 
modeling framework.  We then examine how systems usage, service design and other firm- 
and individual level factors affect switching and retention.  Using data on the online 
brokerage industry, we find significant variation (as much as a factor of 2) in measured 
switching costs.  We find that customer demographic characteristics have little effect on 
switching, but that systems usage measures and systems quality are associated with reduced 
switching.  We also find that firm characteristics such as product line breadth and quality 
reduce switching and may also reduce customer attrition. Overall, we conclude that online 
brokerage firms appear to have different abilities in retaining customers and have 
considerable control over their switching costs through product and service design. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many emerging e-commerce companies, especially those focused on business to consumer (B2C) 
e-commerce, are in an aggressive phase of recruiting new customers in what analysts have called 
a “land grab”.  These firms devote a large amount of their resources to advertising and promotion, 
and increasingly to outright customer subsidies.  For example, E*trade was offering $400 in free 
computer merchandise for new customers who signed up between January and March, 2000.  
E*trade also spent about $400 million in 1999 on selling and marketing, representing over 60% 
of their non-interest expenses and over 45% of net revenue. Customer acquisition costs, which 
are estimated to range from about $40 per customer for Amazon.com to over $400 for some 
online brokers (McVey, 2000), are probably the largest contributor of cost to new B2C startups 
and represent a substantial portion of the initial financial losses these firms typically incur.   
Clearly, the expectation is that these early investments in customer acquisition will result in a 
long-term stream of profits from loyal customers to offset these costs. 
 
Essential to this strategy is that customers experience some form of “lock-in” or switching costs 
to prevent them from defecting to another provider; otherwise firms would be unable to recover 
their initial investments in acquisition.  These switching costs arise from a variety of factors 
including the general nature of the product, the characteristics of customers that firms attract, or 
deliberate strategies and investments by product and service providers.  By creating or exploiting 
switching costs, firms can soften price competition, build a “first mover” advantage, and earn 
supranormal profits on advertising or other investments (see a survey in Klemperer, 1995).  The 
ability to create switching costs and build customer loyalty has also been argued to be a major 
driver of success in e-commerce businesses (Reinchheld and Schefter, 2000).  However, it has 
been observed that over 50% of customers stop visiting completely before their third anniversary 
(Reinchheld and Schefter, 2000). If switching costs are inherently low and firms are unable to 
lock-in customers, long-term profitability may be difficult to attain, especially in many B2C e-
commerce environments with low entry barriers (other than customer acquisition costs) and 
limited differentiation. As a result, it becomes critical for a firm to manage its retention ability, 
which is determined by switching costs and attrition rates. The first step for managing retention 
is to be able to measure the magnitude of switching cost and identify what factors affect   4 
switching and attrition. As stated by Shapiro and Varian (1998), “You just cannot compete 
effectively in the information economy unless you know how to identify, measure, and understand 
switching costs and map strategy accordingly.” 
 
Despite the critical role of switching costs in e-commerce strategy, there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence about the presence, magnitude or impact of switching costs on customer 
behavior.  This appears to be true more broadly – despite a robust theory literature, there are only 
a limited number of empirical analyses on the measurement of switching costs (Elzinga and 
Mills, 1998; Kim et al., 2001) and even fewer that consider how firms might influence their 
customers’ switching costs.  A few studies in the information systems and e-commerce literature 
have looked at related questions, such as price premia for branded retailers (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith, 2000), the relationship between visit frequency and website experience (Moe and Fader, 
2000), customers’ propensity to search (Johnson et al., 2000) and the relationship between 
customer satisfaction and loyalty in online and offline environments (Shankar et al., 2000).   
However, these studies only investigate some aspects of switching or brand loyalty and do not 
consider the factors that influence switching cost.  In particular, they do not explore how systems 
characteristics or system usage affect retention (a key research question identified by Straub and 
Watson, 2001).  
 
In this paper we make three specific contributions.  First, we propose a model for measuring the 
magnitudes of switching costs, and estimate switching costs for service providers utilizing web 
site traffic data, based on the well-known random utility/discrete choice modeling framework 
(McFadden, 1974a).
1   Second, we measure how systems design variables as well as other 
customer and firm-specific characteristics affect switching as well as adoption behavior and 
attrition. Finally, we apply this model to study the online brokerage industry – a large and 
important online industry where switching cost and customer acquisition are a critical part of 
firm strategy and performance.   
 
                                                 
1 This model is applicable to any setting in which a customer’s relationship with multiple service providers can be 
precisely observed.  However, these data are typically difficult to obtain in the offline world because few datasets 
exist that can comprehensively capture customer interactions with multiple, competing businesses.   5 
Using “clickstream” data on over 2000 individuals that utilize the 11 largest online broker sites 
provided by Media Metrix, we find that there is substantial heterogeneity in switching costs 
across providers, and that this variation is robust over time and after correcting for measurement 
biases and heterogeneity in customer characteristics.  Moreover, we show that systems 
characteristics and systems usage as well as other firm and customer characteristics are related to 
a firm’s rate of switching, customer acquisition and attrition.  
 
Overall, our analysis contributes to the literature on economics of IS research by contributing 
approaches and measures for the analysis of customer retention using data commonly available 
for online service providers, as well as demonstrating the relationship between traditional 
information systems characteristics (e.g., DeLone and McLean, 1992) and online consumer 
behavior.  Moreover, our approach can be used in practice to measure and compare switching 
costs and enable firms to understand their retention effectiveness and evaluating alternative 
methods for managing customer retention through systems design changes and improvements in 
other service characteristics. 
   6 
2. Literature Review and Background 
 
2.1 Brand Loyalty and Switching Costs 
 
In many markets, consumers face non-negligible costs of switching between different brands of 
products or services. As classified by Klemperer (1987), there are at least three types of 
switching costs: transaction costs, learning costs, and artificial or contractual costs. Transaction 
costs are costs that occurred to start a new relationship with a provider and sometimes also 
include the costs necessary to terminate an existing relationship.  Learning costs represent the 
effort required by the customer to reach the same level of comfort or facility with a new product 
as they had for an old product.  Artificial switching costs are created by deliberate actions of 
firms: frequent flyer programs, repeat-purchase discounts, and “clickthrough” rewards are all 
examples.  Besides these explicit costs, there are also implicit switching costs associated with 
decision biases (e.g., the “Status Quo Bias”) and risk aversion, especially when the customer is 
uncertain about the quality of other products or brands.  
 
Economists have noted that switching costs can affect a variety of critical competitive 
phenomena.  For instance, switching costs have been linked to prices, entry decisions, new 
product diffusion patterns and price wars (Klemperer, 1987, 1995; Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; 
Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). Much of the economics literature has focused on market-wide 
switching costs—those faced by all adopters of a product (Kim et al., 2001) or addressed some 
specific forms of switching costs, for example, switching costs due to product compatibility or 
network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), common issues in software markets (Bresnahan, 
2001). Although the economics literature has stressed the importance of switching costs, less 
emphasis has been placed on switching costs that can be deliberately varied by firms through 
retention investments and customer heterogeneity in switching cost or brand loyalty, the 
emphasis of the parallel literature in marketing.  
 
The marketing literature has not focused on switching costs directly but has extensively 
examined customer product choice behavior including the choice to change providers or products.  
The focus of this literature has been on the concept of “brand loyalty” which is the tendency of at   7 
least some consumers to engage in repeat purchases of the same brand over time.  There are 
many explanations for brand loyalty, including customer inertia, decision biases, uncertainty in 
the quality of other brands, or other psychological issues.  Much of this extensive literature 
emphasizes the identification of loyal customers (Jacoby and Chestnet, 1978) by individual 
behaviors such as repeat purchases or expressed preferences in surveys or focus groups.   
Typically, loyalty is treated as an intrinsic characteristic of consumers (Jacoby and Chestnet, 
1978; Grover and Srinivasan, 1987; Colombo and Morrison, 1989).  Consequently, this research 
has not focused on the link between firm strategies and investments and changes in switching 
cost or their variation across firms.  
 
The information systems literature typically has paralleled the economic approach, focusing on 
market-wide switching costs and tangible forms of switching costs, like contractual 
commitments, relationship-specific investments, compatibility, and network externalities. 
However, much of this work has centered around specific technology investments rather than IT 
enabled services.  Moreover, while there has been extensive discussion of information systems 
characteristics that could influence customers’ initial choices or acquisition (see the survey in 
DeLone and McLean, 1992); to our knowledge, there is little literature on how system quality 
and usage variables influence switching and attrition. 
 
2.2 Brand Loyalty and Switching Costs in Electronic Markets 
 
While electronic markets appear to have low switching costs since a competing firm is “just a 
click away” (Friedman, 1999), recent research suggests that there is significant evidence of brand 
loyalty in electronic markets. For example, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) found, using data 
from a price comparison service (the DealTime “shopbot”), that customers were willing to pay 
premium prices for books from the retailers they had dealt with previously.  Johnson, et. al. 
(2000) showed that 70% of the CD and book shoppers are loyal to just one site and consumers 
tend to search fewer sites as they become more experienced with online shopping.  One possible 
explanation for these findings is that firms have found ways to retain customers in the online 
channel that introduce new “frictions” where old ones, such as difficulty in searching and 
making comparisons, have been removed.  Examples include frequent-purchaser programs, use   8 
of user profiles for personalization, “clickthrough” rewards, and affiliate programs (Varian, 1999; 
Smith et al. 1999; Bakos, 2001).  Others have suggested that online retention is influenced 
indirectly through engaging website design (Novak et al., 2000). However, the drivers of 
retention have proven difficult to determine empirically due to a lack of suitable measurement 
methods and data.  
 
 2.3 Setting:  The Online Brokerage Industry 
 
Retail brokers provide individual investors with the ability to purchase and trade stocks, bonds 
and other financial instruments.  Online brokers differ from their traditional counterparts in the 
discount brokerage segment by conducting the vast majority of their transactional activity using 
the Internet.   
 
This industry is an interesting candidate to study for a number of reasons.  First, the market is 
large and significant and is considered to be one of the “killer applications” in B2C electronic 
commerce (Varian, 1998; Bakos et al., 2000).  There were over 140 online retail brokers by the 
end of 1999 and they managed just over $1 Trillion in customer assets in 2000.  By year-end 
1999, these accounts represented about 15% of all brokerage assets and 30% of all retail stock 
trades (Saloman Smith Barney, 2000).  Second, as noted in the introduction, this industry has 
very aggressive customer acquisition tactics, partially due to the high lifetime value of an active 
account (>$1000).  Third, the complexity and financial significance of a stock trade makes it 
likely that consumers generally face learning costs and other deterrents to switching, including a 
difficult process of either transferring assets or liquidating stock positions in order to switch 
brokers.  Finally, the industry has a diversity of potential customer retention tactics, which 
enable the study of these factors and their influence on customer switching and retention.  
 
3. The Model 
 
We define switching costs as any perceived disutility a customer would experience from 
switching service providers – including both explicit (e.g, fees, time and effort) and implicit 
(e.g., quality uncertainty) costs.  The model proposed utilizes a natural experiment that is present   9 
in most, if not all, online environments. At any point in time, we observe new customers entering 
the market and making service provider choices, and we also observe existing customers making 
choices on whether to continue their relationship with their existing provider or adopt a different 
provider.  Normally it is difficult to disentangle switching costs from the differences in benefits 
of different service providers, especially benefits that might vary over time. However, given that 
switching costs are faced only by existing customers while the product attributes and marketing 
variables are faced by all users regardless new or old, we can use the adoption behavior of new 
customers as a surrogate of overall utility of the various products/providers since new users’ 
behaviors contain all the information related to the product and the influence of marketing 
variables. If we are willing to assume that preferences (on average) of new customers and 
existing customers are the same absent switching costs we can separate out switching cost effects 
from “quality” differences.
2 This approach, however, is not feasible if one cannot tell new users 
and existing users apart. The advance of the Internet and modern information technology have 
made this data available and thus made the approach proposed possible.
3  
 
Under these conditions, we can estimate the extent of switching costs by comparing the rate of 
adoption of different products for new customers to the rate of switching faced by each product.  
In the extreme case, if there were no switching costs at all, then in each period a customer could 
reconsider their product choices at no cost and would choose products in the same proportion as 
new adopters (assuming that their preferences as a group were equivalent). If, however, customer 
defections have a different distribution across different products than new customer adoption, 
this is indicative of variations in switching costs. 
  
                                                 
2 If we have detailed individual data, we could relax the assumption that new adopters have the same preference 
distribution as the existing adopters by controlling for customer heterogeneity.  
3 The advance of the internet and modern information technology have made this approach achievable with 
clickstream data, the streams of requests (clicks) users generate as they move from page to page within a web site, 
which shows which pages of a site were visited and in what order, as well as how long the visitor remained at each 
page. Now we can discriminate users by cookies, user registration, or sometimes IP address or a combination of any 
two. Cookies are unique IDs placed by file servers on PCs. And IP address is unique for computers connected to the 
Internet, however, IP address may be different if the user uses dial-up connection, and this poses some problems for 
the use of IP address to identify users. Another approach is user registration from a representative group of people, 
and each time the user wants to connect to the web, he has to sign in (most of the time, just a click), so this approach 
identifies actual unique individual. Jupiter Media Metrix uses this approach to gather their panel data by having an 
applet installed in their computers which tracks the user.     10 
The mathematical structure for the analysis is provided by the random utility modeling 
framework (McFadden, 1974a), which has been extensively applied in studying consumer choice 
behavior among multiple products (McFadden, 1974b; Schmidt and Strauss, 1975a,b; Boskin, 
1974; Guadagni and Little, 1983; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000).  Customers make product 
choices with a stochastic process based on random utility framework.  Formally, consider a set of 
consumers who have preferences over a set of goods that are comprised of two parts:  a 
systematic component related to the observable and unobservable characteristics of the good (ν ), 
and a random component which is idiosyncratic to an individual customer and arises due to 
specific tastes or random error in selection (ε ). In this model, a consumer will choose the product 
which maximizes her utility given the attributes of all products and her idiosyncratic tastes. For a 
set of N consumers choosing among M firms, we can write the utility of a particular consumer (i) 
if she chooses firm j ( [1,2,... ] jM ∈ ) as:  
 
iiii ii i
jjjj j j jj uv X Z ε γβ λε =+=+ + +          ( 1 )  
 
Where 
i
j γ  is the unobservable firm-specific effect, X is a vector of firm or product attributes 
including price or cost index and a collection of other relevant attributes, which may include 
marketing variables. β  is a vector of relative weights the customer puts on different firm or 
product attributes. Z is a set of customer characteristics and vector λ  captures customer 
preference parameters. And finally, ε ,  the random component, captures the customer’s 
idiosyncratic, specific tastes or random error in selection.  
 
For analytic convenience, it is typically assumed in the economic literature that individuals in the 
population are statistically identical and independent, which greatly simplifies the analysis 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). A direct implication of this 
assumption is that  and ,
ii
jj j ii j γγ ββ =∀ =∀  and that customer characteristics do not 
play a direct role in their choices. However, this assumption can be easily relaxed by assuming 
that the total population can be divided into subpopulations such that individuals within each 
subpopulation are statistically identical and independent (for example, the latent class model 
used in the marketing literature). Next is the error structure, which is used to determine the 
choice probabilities of customers. If we assume that the error term is independent and identically   11 
distributed with "extreme value" distribution  (that is, prob e where j
e .( ) , εε ε
ε
≤= − ∞ < < ∞
−
−
), 
then we have a simple expression for the choice probabilities (or the fraction of consumers that 
choose provider j):  
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However, this type of error structure is governed by independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) – that is, the ordinal ranking of any two products does not depend on the presence or 
absence of an alternative choice.   In a more general framework, error terms are assumed to be 
distributed according to the generalized extreme value distribution, which resolves somewhat 
restrictive IIA assumption (McFadden, 1978; 1980, 1981).  Consider a function G satisfying: 
1.  G is a nonnegative function defined over 
m R+  and is homogeneous of degree 1.  
2.  1 lim ( ,..., ,..., ) 1...
i xi m Gx x x f o ri m →∞ =∞ = . 
3.  The mixed partial derivatives of G exist and are continuous, with non-positive even and 
nonnegative odd mixed partial derivatives. 
 
With these assumptions, if the joint distribution function  1,..., m εε   is given by 
1
1 ( ,..., ) exp[ ( ... )]
m x x
m Fx x Ge e
− − =− , this is a multivariable extreme value distribution. If G takes 
the form  1
1
( ,... )
M
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j
Gy y y
=
= ∑ , the variables  1.. j jM ε ∀= are independently Weibull distributed 
and the choice problem reduces to the multinomial logit model, as equation (3) shows. However, 
in general, McFadden (1978, 1980, 1981) has shown that a random utility-maximization model 
in which the multivariate distribution function is given by  () F ⋅   has choice probabilities 
satisfying 
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= where  j G is the partial derivative of G with respect to its jth argument.   12 
The choice probabilities can be further rewritten in a more transparent manner as (Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman, 1985): 
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These choice probabilities then again have the form of MNL. In general, G may depend on the 
“clustering” of alternatives in attribute space. An example of a more general G function 
satisfying the hypotheses of GEV theorem is (McFadden, 1980): 
1
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c σ is an index of the similarity of the unobserved attributes of alternatives in  c B . 
 
We now introduce switching costs in this model.   
 
|| | | |
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Where  |
i
jk s   is the matrix of switching costs of customer i from switching from k to j,  |
i
jk W  
captures customer i’s transition path. j. Theoretically, if we assume that 
ii i
jj j j XZ γβ λ ++ has 
captured all relevant factors related to customers’ choices, then customer switching cost should 
directly depend on where she switches to, that is, we can say that customer switching cost 
depends on only where she is from but not where she is switching to. As a result, we could 
reduce  |
i
jk W  and  |
i
jk s  from a MxM matrix to a vector with M elements. Another possible extension 
of the model is to assume two kinds of switching costs, the switching out costs, namely s, and the 
adoption costs, which capture a notion of the switching in costs. Moreover, we assume that 
switching cost does not influence customers adoption choices, that is, customers do not know the 
level of switching cost from a certain product or service provider ex-ante, as a result, it can’t 
affect her choice.  
   13 
Consider now a two-period setting where some consumers choose a product in period 1, while 
others do not.  In period 2, some of the early adopters stay, some of the early adopters switch 
products, and new customers enter the market that had not previously adopted.  For a consumer 
who chose firm k in period 1, her utility from choosing to stay with product k in period 2 is (note 
we dropped the superscript of customer index):  
| kk k k k k uv X ε β ε =+= +                          (6) 
where the notation ua|b denotes the utility a customer gets if she chooses product b in period 1 
and then switches to product a in period 2.  
However, if she decides to replace product k with another (product j), she incurs a switching cost 
sk, and as a result, the utility of choosing j is: 
| jk j k j j k j uv s X s ε β ε =−+= −+                       (7) 
If the user is new in period 2, then there is no switching cost, so the utility of choosing any j is 
(where we denote “n” as representing new users): 
| jn j j j j uv X ε β ε =+= +                          (8) 
 
Note that we have implicitly assumed that the preferences for new customers over price and 
other attributes is the same for new customers as well as existing customers, except for switching 
costs and the customer-specific utility (or individual idiosyncrasy).  However, customers who 
switch differ from new adopters in that they incur the disutility from switching.  Given the utility 
expression derived in equation (4) and (5) the probability that a user from firm k will choose to 
stay with firm k is: 
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Given this, the “odds ratio” for staying with product k over switching to product j is:   14 
|
|
ln
|
ln
|
kk k
jk j k
vG
kk
vs G
jk
p e
p e
+
−+ =                      ( 1 0 )  
or 
|
|
k
jk
v
kk
vs
jk
p e
p e
− =  under MNL 
 
Similarly the equivalent odds ratio for a new adopter choosing product k over product j is:  
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Note that Equation (11) becomes 
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Under the general GEV model: 
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by dividing (12) over (13), we can get a measure of the level of switching cost: 
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For and , and cd kB m tB cd ∈∈ ≠ , we have a much more complex expression:  
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Under MNL, the switching costs can be calculated immediately by: 
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The above analysis gives us a quick index of the level of switching cost of each firm regardless 
of sources of these switching costs without individual level data. If we observe asymmetric 
switching costs across firms, this could result from heterogeneous customers attracted by these 
firms or heterogeneous firm retention abilities. And if we have individual level data, we can 
further explore the drivers of switching cost. The following model can be used to identify 
sources of switching cost if we have individual level data:  
 
|| |
ii i i i i i
jk j j j j jk jk j uX Z W s γβ λε =+ + − +  
   
Empirically, it would be difficult to assume that we can account for all relevant factors that affect 
customers choices, as a result, the assumption that switching cost depends only on where the 
customer is from may be a little restrictive, and we may need a more flexible W matrix to 
capture some switching patterns or to test the validity of simpler structure. Empirical 
implementation will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical Application: Hypotheses and Methodology   16 
 
4.1 Key Constructs and Hypotheses 
 
For our purposes, we define switching as a change of the major brokerage firm by a customer 
and attrition as a cease of a customer’s brokerage activity entirely throughout the time period we 
analyze.  Switching behavior is influenced by switching costs which are defined as any perceived 
disutility a customer would experience from switching service providers.  Our analysis proceeds 
in two parts.  We first calculate and analyze measures of switching cost to establish that 
switching costs do indeed vary across firms.  We will then proceed to document the factors, 
especially user behavior and system design characteristics that influence switching and attrition.  
Our analysis will focus on web site quality, ease of use, and cost which are well established 
constructs in the IS literature, as well as new characteristics such as web site personalization.  
Moreover, customer behaviors (especially system usage variables) and characteristics may also 
be related to the switching or attrition decision. Table 1 summarizes these factors along with 
descriptions and variable names. 
 
We begin with a simple (null) hypothesis: 
 
H1:  There are no significant differences in measured switching cost across firms 
 
To the extent that this hypothesis can be rejected and switching costs vary, our analysis will 
focus on distinguishing the role of firm and customer effects because they are associated with 
different observable variables and have different strategic implications.  If switching behavior is 
driven solely by customer characteristics, then the challenge for firms is to target and prescreen 
customers who are more likely to be loyal either through observable attributes or past behaviors.  
If it is solely due to firm practices, then the challenge is to design their service offerings and 
products such that they either attract loyal customers or lock-in customers once they are 
acquired.  Our empirical analysis will attempt to distinguish these effects by statistically 
controlling for the influence of customer heterogeneity.  Thus, we formulate our second 
hypothesis as: 
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H2:  There are no significant differences in measured switching cost across firms after 
controlling for customer characteristics 
 
The most commonly studied customer characteristic in consumer behavior research is 
demographics.  However, since demographics and other intrinsic customer characteristics are 
unchanging over time, we do not expect that these factors directly affect switching as long as 
consumers are well enough informed to make good initial product choices.  However, they may 
be indirectly correlated with other customer characteristics, which in turn affect retention.  Thus, 
we expect demographics might have an effect, but cannot make a specific magnitude or sign 
prediction. On the other hand, various observed customer behaviors may be directly indicative of 
customer characteristics that affect switching.  For instance, consumers who adopt multiple 
service providers may be inherently “disloyal” and more likely to switch.  Customers who 
change their usage patterns might also be more inclined to switch to the extent this suggests a 
change in underlying preferences.  However, web site usage itself does not have a clear 
prediction – on the one hand, usage might suggest learning or other psychological lock-in at a 
service provider indicating lower switching propensity (as suggested by Johnson et al., 2000).  
One the other hand, high usage customers might also have the greatest incentive for maximizing 
service provider “fit”, and could be more likely to switch. Based on the discussion above, we can 
directly examine the effects of customer characteristics on switching. Our hypotheses are:  
 
H3a: Use of multiple brokers is positively correlated with switching.   
H3b: Changes in usage patterns is positively correlated with switching.   
H3c: High volume of web site usage is negatively correlated with switching.   
    
We now consider how various firm-specific practices affect switching beyond the effects of 
differences in customer characteristics.  While we are partially constrained by data availability, 
we are able to capture many of the central factors that might effect switching.  Cost and quality 
are probably the most studied factors that affect consumer demand in IS, marketing or economic 
models.  In general, higher quality may reduce switching because it may build greater affinity 
with customers and decrease the chance of a negative customer service interaction (Boulding et 
al., 1993; Gans, 2000).  We have no particular prediction of the effect of cost – while cost is 
often an important decision on which service to adopt, customers are generally fully informed 
about cost and thus it is doubtful that it has an effect on switching.  A third factor which has been   18 
identified in previous IT value research is product variety (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1995) – while 
this clearly contributes to customer value, it may also deter switching since firms that offer a 
broader product line can satisfy a greater range of customer needs, especially if needs change 
over time.  
 
We are also interested in two specific factors directly related to computer-mediated services: web 
site personalization and ease of use.  Internet firms are increasingly able to tailor their customer 
interface and services to specific needs through personalization technologies – it is hoped that 
these technologies will build greater customer lock in and retention (Crosby and Stephens, 1987; 
Pearson, 1998; Mobasher et al., 2000; Cingil et al., 2000).  Ease of use has been a critical factor 
in many studies of IS adoption with the general perspective that ease of use promotes service 
adoption (DeLone and McLean, 1992).  However, in the context of switching there may be a 
negative effect – to the extent that easy to use sites do not force consumers to make sunk 
investments in learning, switching costs may indeed be lower for services that are easier to use 
(this is the converse of an argument made previously by Johnson et. al., 2000).  Overall, we 
expect: 
 
H4a: Switching is negatively correlated with personalization. 
H4b: Switching is positively correlated with ease of use. 
H4c: Switching is negatively correlated with quality.   
H4d: Switching is negatively correlated with breadth of offerings.   
H4e: Switching is not related to cost.    
 
These predictions are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
In addition to the focus on switching, it may also be useful to consider the closely related issue of 
customer attrition since it is the absence of both switching and attrition that determines a firm’s 
ability to retain customers.   The predictions on attrition largely parallel that of switching.  As 
before, we have no strong predictions for demographics, although we would expect higher 
volume users and those with multiple brokers to be less likely to disappear, suggesting that some 
behavioral characteristics will matter.  
 
H5a: Use of multiple brokers is negatively correlated with attrition.     19 
H5b: High volume of web site usage is negatively correlated with attrition. 
 
By the same arguments as for switching, we would generally expect that personalization, quality, 
and breadth of offerings reduce attrition, and cost should have little effect.  However, we expect 
ease of use to play a different role here -- customers may be more likely to depart because the 
interface is too difficult to use.  Also, we consider an additional factor, minimum account sizes 
(the amount of money the customer must deposit upon initiating an account), that could act as a 
screen against customers who intend only to collect new user subsides but not to actually use the 
service.  We therefore expect: 
 
H6a:  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with personalization. 
H6b:  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with quality. 
H6c:  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with breadth of offerings. 
H6d:  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with ease of use. 
H6e:  Customer attrition is not related to cost.   
H6f:  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with account minimums. 
 
Again, these predictions are graphically summarized in Figure 1. 
 
4.2  Methodology:  Measurement of Switching Cost 
 
To examine H1 and H2, the random utility framework introduced in Section 3 is used. In the 
setting of brokerage industry, the choices are brokerage firms, and the systematic component of 
utility includes aspects specific to the brokerage firms chosen: a price index (rj), a vector of non-
price attributes (xj), and a unique dummy variable for each firm to capture unobservable firm-
specific effects (γ j) .  Consumer choice is also affected by characteristics of individuals: a vector 
of customer characteristics (zi) and a set of dummy variables (W ) capturing where the customer 
is from.  In specific, the underlying model we estimate is:  
 
1
[1,2.. ], [1,2.. ]
M
ii i
jjj j j k kj
k
ux r zs W i N j M γβ α λ ε
=
=+ − + − + ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∑       (17) 
 
Where  γ ( an unobserved firm-specific effect), β ( a vector of utility weights reflecting the 
importance of non-price attributes xj), α ( the utility weight reflecting the importance of price   20 
index rj),  j λ ( the customer preference parameters for firm j)  and sj (switching cost of firm j) are 
to be estimated.  The estimation of the switching cost parameters (sj) is our primary concern.  
Utility (uij) is an unobserved latent variable that is revealed through a customer’s choice of 
service provider (that is, we know that when customer i chooses firm j this choice maximizes 
their utility).   Several additional notes about this formulation are in order.  First, this model is 
typically implemented by simultaneously estimating individual logistic (binary) choice equations 
for each firm for each customer– this yields a total of M firms x N individuals or MxN data 
points.  In the discussion that follows we will sometimes refer to one of the individual firms’ 
equations. Second, our only deviation from the standard model is the inclusion of a vector of 
dummy variables, one element per firm,  k W , which takes on the value of 1 if customer i is a 
potential switcher from firm k and zero otherwise.  In other words, the dummy variable is 1 
whenever a customer of a particular firm would face a switching cost if they chose to switch to 
another.  The estimated values of the parameters on this set of dummy variables ( k W ) are the 
switching cost parameters ( k s ) for each firm--the cost (disutility) a consumer must overcome 
when switching from firm k ( [1,2,... ] kM ∈ ) to another firm.  Note that we have implicitly 
assumed that the switching cost does not depend on the firm the customer switches to, but only 
on the firm she switches from (a testable assumption and one satisfied by our data).
4 Third, the 
use of the conditional logit estimation method embeds an assumption about consumer choice 
known as “independence of irrelevant alternatives” or IIA.  This is the assumption that that the 
relative utility of any two products is independent of the characteristics of products other than the 
ones compared (this is also testable and satisfied by our data).   Finally, we note that this is a 
choice equation over firms where the switching cost parameters are estimated – the firm and 
price effects do not represent the effects on switching cost but the effect on overall choice.  We 
will assess drivers of switching cost in a separate analysis. 
 
                                                 
4 The reason this holds in our data maybe because the brokers we consider are roughly comparable in terms of 
consumer awareness.   If some service providers in our analysis are considered inferior to the others, then this 
assumption would have to be reconsidered.    21 
4.3  Methodology:  Drivers of Switching and Attrition 
 
To estimate the effects of firm attributes and customer characteristics on switching (for 
hypotheses H3 and H4), we can proceed in two ways.  First, we can compute switching cost 
estimates for each firm and regress these on firm and customer characteristics.  However, this 
strategy is limited in this context by the small number of firms and time periods (a total of 33 
estimates across 3 quarters) and thus may have low statistical power.  It also does not enable 
direct comparisons with adoption or attrition predictors nor can it easily examine customer-
specific effects.  Alternatively, rather than testing the direct effect of firm attributes on switching 
costs, we can test how firm attributes and customer characteristics influence customers’ 
switching behaviors. That is, we predict switching as a function of customer characteristics and 
firm attributes using logistic regression.  Formally, we estimate the model: 
 
Pr( )
ss s s i i
jj j j Switch x r z γβ αλε =+ − + +           ( 1 8 )  
 
Switch is a variable which is 1 if the customer switches, and zero otherwise.  The parameters 
(,,,
sss s γβ αλ ) are analogous to (but not the same as) the parameters included in the switching 
cost estimation model (17) – we use the superscript s to distinguish these coefficients from those 
in the earlier analysis.  These parameters represent the influence of time-invariant firm specific 
switching effects, the effects of firm practices, the effects of price, and the effects of customer 
characteristics on switching rates, respectively. 
 
Similarly, we can study the effects of firm attributes and customer characteristics on attrition (for 
hypotheses H5-H6) by the following model:  
 
 Pr( )
aa a a i i
jj j j attrit x r z γβ αλε =+ − + +           ( 1 9 )  
 
Attrit is a variable which is 1 if the customer ceases all their brokerage activities entirely through 
the end of our data period, and zero otherwise.  The parameters ( , , ,
aaa a γβ αλ ) parallel those 
included in the estimation model (18) with superscript a to distinguish these coefficients.     22 
4.4 Data:  Site Usage 
 
Our primary data for this study is drawn from a panel of “clickstream” data provided by Media 
Metrix.  Media Metrix has a panel of more than 25,000 households that have an applet installed 
in their computers which tracks the user, time and URL of every page request they make on the 
world-wide web. They also collect demographic information from the users (gender, household 
income, age, education level, occupation, race and others).  This enables us to use these data for 
individual-level control variables, and also enables Media Metrix to ensure that their panel is 
demographically consistent over time and representative of the US Internet-using population.  
Our analysis is focused on four consecutive quarters of data from July, 1999 to June, 2000 which 
we label Q399, Q499, Q100 and Q200. We restrict our analysis to customers who are tracked by 
Media Metrix in all four quarters so that we can get proper estimates of the number of first 
period non-adopters and track customers’ flow during this time frame. 
 
Using analyst reports (Salomon Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) we identified 
the 11 largest retail brokers,
5 which account for over 95% of all online brokerage accounts, and 
extracted all page references to these sites.  We use the number of days that a broker is accessed 
and total time spent in a quarter as a proxy for activity at the broker. We restrict our analysis to 
individuals who are registered account holders at these brokers – individuals who browse broker 
sites that do not have an account are excluded. To determine whether a customer is an account-
holder or not, we examine the individual URLs that each customer visited – if they accessed any 
pages that are restricted to account-holders for at least 5 active seconds
6 during the period, we 
define the customer as an account holder.  We corroborated our estimates of overall market share 
with other sources (Salomon Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) and found them to 
be consistent with a Pearson correlation over 90% and 98% rank order correlation. 
  
There are two key limitations of these data.  First, while we can tell whether the customer is an 
account holder, we cannot determine their trading volume since, in general, we cannot identify 
                                                 
5 These brokers are Ameritrade, Datek, DLJDirect, E*Trade, Fidelity, Fleet (which owns QRonline and Suretrade), 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Online, Schwab, TDWaterhouse, Vanguard, and National Discounted Brokerage 
(NDB).   
6 We identified over 2000 unique URLs on these sites which we classified.  The 5 second limit was utilized to catch 
non-customers who reached a restricted page and were automatically redirected.   23 
whether a page view corresponds to a trade.  However, previous studies have suggested a 
positive relationship between visiting frequency and purchase propensity (Roy, 1994; Moe and 
Fader, 2000).  This suggests that people who visit a broker more frequently will be more likely to 
trade.  
 
A second issue is that our data covers home usage but not work usage.  Given that significant 
trading activity in many accounts occurs during the daytime when the financial markets are open, 
our visit frequencies may not be indicative of trading activity. However, as long as there is 
positive connection between visiting frequency and trading propensity, which is very likely to be 
true, then visiting frequency still contains valuable information. More importantly, to the extent 
that most users utilize these sites for both trading (during market hours) and research and 
financial management in the off-hours, we are not likely to be missing the overall adoption 
decision.  There are also possible errors introduced by the presence of financial services 
aggregators (e.g., Yodlee.com) that enable customers to manage their accounts without visiting 
the sites, but these services are used by less than 1% of the customers in our analysis.  We 
address the general problem of missing some customer usage of these sites by aggregating our 
data to calendar quarters – this way, if a customer makes any access to these sites during the 
quarter we will properly capture their broker choices.   
 
In our sample, 80% (2321) of the customers have only one broker at a point in time. For the 
remaining 20%, we define a “major broker” for each customer, who is the broker for which the 
customer visits the brokers account holders’ pages most often. Our switching analysis therefore 
focuses on customers who change their major broker.  We chose this strategy for several reasons.  
First, and most importantly, it allows us to accommodate users with multiple brokers.  Second, it 
enables us to compare the switching behavior of multiple broker users to other customers, since 
we would generally believe that these customers face lower switching costs.  Finally, our results 
do not appear to be sensitive to this assumption, as similar switching cost estimates were found 
in earlier work that tracks all accounts (Chen and Hitt, 2000).   24 
 
4.5 Data:  Broker Characteristics 
 
We also utilize additional data from Gomez Advisors, an online market research firm, to 
determine the attributes of the sites we study. Gomez tracks firm-level characteristics in five 
dimensions:  cost, consumer confidence (related to an abstract notion of “quality”), online 
resources (breadth of offerings), relationship services (equivalent to a degree of personalization), 
and ease of use.  These factors are broadly representative of the factors used by other consumer 
rating services, but have the advantage that they are defined by analysts rather than consumers 
(thus removing possible biases of customer heterogeneity), measured consistently over time, and 
are measured by an extensive measurement process at a finer level of granularity than other 
rating services that principally provide an “overall satisfaction” score.
7   The definitions and 
measurements of these factors are also listed in the Appendix as publicly described by Gomez 
(no data was available on the subcomponents of these scores that they use internally).  We also 
include a measure of the required initial investment to establish an account for use in the attrition 
analysis gathered directly from the brokers’ web sites.    
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
5.1 Summary Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
 
Among our four datasets from Media Metrix, we have a total of 28,807 households, of which 
11,397 households are tracked throughout the period of interest (this includes both web users 
who use online brokers and web users who do not).  Restricting our sample to only individuals 
that appear in all datasets, we have 1,249 broker users in Q399, 1,393 in Q499, 1,780 in Q100 
and 1,586 in Q200.  Overall, we have 2,902 unique broker users, including 1,653 new adopters 
during the year of interest. Figure 2 shows the movement of customers among different 
categories between two consecutive quarters.  
 
                                                 
7 The methodology of Gomez Advisors for the measurements can be found at: 
http://www.gomez.com/about/releases.asp?art_id=5068&subSect=methodology&topcat_id=0   25 
Among the 2,902 unique users (from 2,257 households) we examine, 303 of them change their 
major broker during the year we track. Figure 3 shows user flow by broker.   For example, 
among all E*Trade users, 55.7% of them remain active and stay with E*Trade, 10.6% of them 
switch out while 33.7% of them become inactive.  Note that we define inactive as not returning 
to a broker at any time in the future through the end of our data period (as opposed to simply 
having no access during an intermediate period and then returning in a later period).  As evident 
from the figure, there is considerable variation on switching and attrition rates.  Schwab and 
Datek have a higher retention rate than DLJDirect, E*Trade, MSDW and Vanguard. For the top 
three brokers, E*Trade has the most serious problem of customer departure. Their switching rate 
is more than 1.5 times that of Fidelity and Schwab, and attrition rate is the highest across all 
brokers we examine. These differences in flow rates are both economically and statistically 
significant (
2 χ (20)=69.32, p<0.001). Moreover, retention rates, switching rates and attrition 
rates across brokers are all economically and statistically different (p<0.001). 
 
5.2 Variation in Switching Costs 
 
The switching cost framework we introduce in Section 3 provides a method of calculating 
switching costs that does not rely on a specific functional form – only that the assumption of that 
new users and existing users as a group
8 have the same preference structure absent the influence 
of switching costs.  Because the units of the switching cost measure are ambiguous (due to the 
scaling of variables used in the analysis
9), we treat these estimates as relative values.   
 
The calculated switching cost values based on equation (16)
10  for each pair of quarters are 
presented in Table 2a (Column 1-3).  Note that the switching cost measures for each pair of 
quarters appear to be very stable over time.  The Pearson correlation is over 90% and rank order 
correlation is over 75% for each pair.  The data in the Table is also depicted graphically in Figure 
3, which highlights the similarity of the measures over time.  This suggests that we can pool our 
data over time, increasing statistical power.  The switching cost estimates from the pooled 
analysis is reported on Table 2a, column 4.  
                                                 
8 Or one can say that the representative new user and representative existing user have the same preferences.   
9 The value we use for firm attributes are relative scores as recorded by Gomez Advisors, which are 0-10 scales. 
10 Assuming the error term follows the extreme value distribution.   26 
  
This measured switching cost is the disutility perceived by a representative user of each broker 
regardless of source (customer or firm characteristics).  Based on these estimates, we know that 
NDB and Datek have the “stickiest” sites, with switching costs over 2 times that of E*trade.  
Among the three largest brokers, it is about 1.5 times more difficult to induce a representative 
customer of Schwab to switch than to induce a representative customer of E*Trade to switch, 
ceteris paribus.  This simple analysis cannot distinguish switching due to customer 
characteristics and switching due to firm characteristics.  Nonetheless, this does provide an 
estimate of overall switching costs and it is consistent with earlier work that used a different 
subset of the data and slightly different methods (Chen and Hitt, 2000a).  
 
The ratio analysis has the advantage that it has minimal data requirements – one need only 
calculate the fraction of customers who stay at each broker, and the market share for new 
adopters.  However, more complicated tests (such as validating the IIA assumption, controlling 
for customer heterogeneity and many others) are much more easily conducted in a regression 
framework using disaggregated individual choice data.  We begin by estimating a simple 
conditional logit model that computes switching cost using the model described in equation (17), 
including controls for firm attributes, firm-specific dummy variables and time dummy variables.  
This analysis yields switching cost estimates (Table 2a column 5) that are very close to our ratio 
analysis shown in columns 1-4.  This is not surprising, as they utilize the same underlying model.   
To examine H1 (equivalence of switching cost), we test whether that all firms have the same 
switching cost – this is clearly rejected (
2(10) 189, 0.0001 P χ =< ).  The estimated switching 
costs, with 95% confidence intervals, are shown in Figure 4a.  
 
More interestingly, the switching cost estimates are not substantially changed if we include a full 
set of demographic controls
11 in the analysis (Table 2a Column 6). The estimated switching costs 
after controls for customer heterogeneity, with 95% confidence intervals, are shown in Figure 4b. 
Based on the regression results, we are again able to easily reject the hypothesis that switching 
costs are identical across brokers even controlling for demographics and individual customer 
                                                 
11 These demographic controls are age, gender, income, education, market size, race, household size, marital status, 
and occupation.  We also include the individual characteristics number of brokers used and visit frequency.   27 
characteristics (
2(10) 162, 0.0001 P χ =< ).  For example, we find that E*Trade has significantly 
lower switching cost than all the other brokers we track (Figure 4b).  It is also notable that Figure 
4a and Figure 4b are quite similar, suggesting that the overall effect of customer characteristics 
on switching is small. We therefore can also reject H2 (equivalence of switching cost, controlling 
for customer characteristics).  Overall, this suggests that there is a significant firm-specific 
component of switching cost.  We will explore this variation in the next section. 
 
5.3 Robustness of the Switching Cost Estimates 
 
In formulating the model, we have made several key assumptions, most of which are testable in 
our regression framework.  As stated earlier, we can test whether the independence assumption 
(IIA) holds, and find evidence that IIA is supported for our data. Second, we can examine the 
assumption that switching costs depend only on the firm a customer switches from and not the 
destination firm by estimating a more general switching cost model that includes all possible 
combinations of previous and new broker.  Our analysis suggests that the hypothesis that the 
adoption distribution for switching customers is the same for all brokers can not be rejected 
(
2(110) 59.24, 1.00 P χ == ), validating this assumption. These two tests are actually closely 
linked since both are implied by IIA, but differ in implementation. 
  
However, a potentially problematic assumption is that choice behavior for new customers and 
existing customers is similar.  One specific way in which this can be violated is if brokers have 
“new user” subsidies or other benefits that can only be realized by new adopters.  Since these 
subsidies may attract more customers to adopt but do not increase the incentive to stay, it could 
skew adoption rates relative to retention rates and lead to an underestimate of switching costs for 
those brokers that have the greatest subsides.
12 Since we do not have customer-specific data or 
even complete broker-specific data on subsidies, and most brokers have a wide variety of 
subsidy programs for new users, we cannot measure subsides directly.  However, analogous to 
switching costs (a cost to leave), we can define and measure an “adoption cost” for each broker 
(which is directly related to the effectiveness of firms’ subsidy program), and examine whether 
firms have different adoption cost after controlling for customer and broker characteristics.   
                                                 
12 We thank Arun Sundararajan for noting this issue.   28 
When adoption is subsidized we would generally expect this to be a negative “cost” for 
customers that may or may not vary by brokers.  If this cost varies by broker or appears to be 
substantial, we will have to elaborate our switching cost framework to adjust for these 
differences.   
 
Identification of adoption cost proceeds in the same way as our switching cost measure.  We 
assume that a user does not face any adoption cost (ac) if she does not switch ( | kk k k uv ε =+ ), but 
adoption cost influences a new user’s adoption decision ( | kn k k k uv a c ε =− + ) and a switcher’s 
“where to switch to” decision ( | jk j j k j u v ac s ε =− −+ ).   Because we have three types of 
customers and three unknown parameters (v, ac, s), adoption cost can be identified.  This can be 
captured using a second dummy variable ( k V ) defined in a way that parallels the switching cost 
dummy ( k W ) from equation (11).  Let  1 k V =  if the customer is either a new adopter in the 
adoption equation for broker k, or a customer that is an existing customer at a different broker.  It 
is zero otherwise.  Regression estimates of adoption cost are presented in Table2b.  The test 
result shows that while Ameritrade and Datek seem to have lower adoption costs these 
differences are not significant, and the magnitude of adoption cost is minimal comparing to the 
switching cost level (which are measured in the same units).  This suggests that our earlier 
switching results are robust to the assumption of common adoption behavior between new and 
existing customers. 
 
Taken collectively, our results suggest that we have a robust finding that switching costs vary 
across brokers and that most observable customer characteristics (e.g. demographics and usage) 
have only a limited influence on switching costs.  This suggests the presence of a strong firm 
effect.  In the following sections we explore the drivers of switching as well as customer 
acquisition to better understand how brokers influence customers’ switching behavior (and other 
aspects of building a customer base). 
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5.4 Predictors of Switching Behavior 
 
We have defined switching to be the change of customers’ major brokerage firm. In Table 3 we 
estimate three variants of estimation model (2) on switching.  First, we examine a regression 
with only customer characteristics (Column 1).   We find that demographics have little effect on 
overall switching behavior as expected.  However, more specific indicators of individual 
differences are much better predictors of switching.  Customers who have adopted fewer brokers 
are less likely to switch – this is consistent if we interpret this measure as capturing unobserved 
propensity to be loyal.  In terms of systems usage variables, changes in usage affect switching, 
and interestingly, we find that level of web site activity is associated with reduced switching, 
which is consistent with a story that greater experience with a service provider creates implicit 
lock-in through learning (as suggested by Johnson et al., 2000). These results lend support to our 
arguments summarized in the discussion in H3.  
 
In Column 2 of Table 3, we also add characteristics of the brokers to the analysis (the measures 
are the characteristics of the broker a customer used in that period). Overall, we find that higher 
quality (measuring system and information quality of the site) reduces switching while ease of 
use has a negative effect on customer retention. Surprisingly, the availability of web site 
personalization is not shown to have significant effect on reducing switching, inconsistent with 
the idea that personalization leads to greater customer lock-in.   
 
In Column 3, Table 3, broker dummies are added to the regression to capture any firm level 
effects on switching.   This eliminates the effects of levels of the broker attributes and thus 
changes the coefficient interpretation of the broker characteristics variables to the effects of 
changes in these factors.  Quality and ease of use are no longer significant in the firm-effects 
regression suggesting that these characteristics but we do find a strong beneficial effect of 
increasing resources (breadth of product line) and also that personalization now is marginally 
significant with the “wrong” sign. Thus, we find support for the assertions in H4b-e (firm-level 
determinants of switching), except for the result on personalization (H4a), in both levels and 
fixed effects regressions. 
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This analysis indicates that higher quality and increasing product line breadth are helpful in 
reducing switching, but that most other factors have little influence on switching.  However, we 
still find large firm-level variation in switching as evidenced by our earlier results and the strong 
significance levels of the broker dummies (Table 3 column 3) even when control variables for 
specific practices are included.  This suggests that while we have identified some of the 
mechanisms by which firms influence (or might be able to influence) their switching costs, they 
still have significant control over their switching costs in ways other than the variables we have 
identified. 
 
5.5 Drivers of Customer Attrition 
 
In our earlier analysis, we found that attrition (customers who have a brokerage account at some 
time but do not return to any broker in the future) is a significant problem.  Figure 3 shows that 
attrition rates range from 33.7% for E*trade to 25% for Schwab.  There are a variety of reasons 
for attrition, most notably customer experimentation, especially experimentation encouraged by 
subsidies.  We conduct a parallel analysis for attrition that we performed for switching using 
estimating model (3). 
  
In Table 4 we present 4 variations of the base model (the three considered previously for 
switching, but also an additional model that includes only firm-specific dummy variables and 
demographics). 
 
Behavioral variables tend to be good predictors of attrition: frequent visitors and people with 
more accounts are less likely to become inactive, lending support to H5a and H5b. From the 
Table, we find that there are strong seasonal effects in attrition – attrition rates rose dramatically 
in Q2 2000. In addition, our data shows that the average visit frequency in Q200 is only 85% of 
that in Q100. Besides these observed variables, we find that E*Trade and Ameritrade have 
significantly greater attrition rates than Schwab (Table 4 column 2 and column 4).  Greater 
minimum deposits are effective in reducing attrition rate (column 3) and, as before, cost has no 
effect and ease of use has a negative effect on attrition.   These results are, consistent with our 
prior arguments in H6e and H6f with the exception that personalization, quality, breadth of   31 
offerings and ease of use are not found to have positive effect on attrition (H6a-d). The test 
results for all hypotheses are summarized in Table 5. 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
Overall our analysis suggests that, using a variety of techniques, there are substantial differences 
in switching cost across brokers and that this variation is not solely due to variations in customer 
characteristics, at least along the dimensions we can measure.  We find usage and changes in 
usage to be good predictors of switching and attrition, suggesting the importance of system usage 
variables on studying firms’ switching costs. We also find that firm characteristics such as 
minimum balances, overall “site quality” and cost also influence customers’ behaviors.  
  
Ideally, a firm would like highest acquisition rate and lowest switching rate and attrition rates.  
Our analysis enables us to make comparisons on the types of factors that might be generally 
more desirable in building a large and loyal customer base, while identifying others that involve 
tradeoffs among practices or may be unexpectedly undesirable.  For example, high levels of 
customer service may increase acquisition and reduce switching and attrition, while low 
minimum account requirements may improve acquisition at the expense of increasing switching 
or attrition.  Using analyses we discussed earlier, we can summarize these effects in a single 
table (Table 6) using a consistent set of control variables.  Note that we have altered the signs of 
the coefficients such that “+” is good, and “-“ is bad; a factor is coded as “NS” if it is not 
statistically significant (p>0.05).   
 
The results in Table 6 suggest that breadth of product offering appears to be universally 
beneficial (provided it can be provided at reasonable costs).  Others have tradeoffs – low 
minimum balances increase acquisition at the expense of attrition.  Interestingly, technology 
strategies that should be beneficial do not appear to be helpful:  ease of use appears either 
ineffective or negative, and investments in personalization (“relationship services”) appear to 
have no effect at best.  For ease of use, it may suggest that improvements in ease of use reduce 
functionality, or it could be possible that sophisticated interface design creates lock-in due to the 
time (cost) of learning a complex interface.  For web site personalization, it may simply reflect   32 
that the personalization technology used by firms is still primitive or firms do not invest enough 
in these services to be effective – a situation that may change over time as personalization 
technology diffuses and matures.  Alternatively, it could be that customers have different 
preferences in the degree of personalization and it is reflected in their initial choices, and as a 
result, personalization does not influence customers switching decisions. It could also be that 
firms’ investments in personalization technology do not address customers’ needs, that 
customers do not actually use it, or that the dimensions captured by Gomez Advisors may not 
capture all dimensions of personalization that consumers actually value.  This suggests that 
future work should be undertaken to evaluate the impact of personalization to distinguish 
between measurement problems and a true absence of an effect. 
 
It is also important to note that demographics typically are not good predictors of behavior 
except for a few isolated results on attrition. One notable result is that women are found to be 
more likely to become inactive.  This gender effect appears consistent with a recent study by 
Barber and Odeon (1999) which found that men trade online significantly more frequently than 
women, so it is not surprising that women are more likely to become inactive.  Interestingly, our 
visit frequency data is fairly consistent with Barber and Odeon’s study – our data shows that 
single men visit their brokers 58% more than single women, while their corresponding number 
for trading volume is 67%.  This suggests that our visit frequency information may not be a bad 
proxy for trading behavior, at least when making comparisons in aggregate. Moreover, the 
seasonal effect found in attrition analysis that attrition rates rose dramatically in Q2 2000 appears 
to be consistent with that has been reported by a recent issue of Business Week (Gogoi, 2000): 
“overall, online trading volume fell more than 20% in the second quarter (2000)….”. This 
seasonal effect is likely driven by market conditions since the Nasdaq and Internet stocks in 
particular experienced declines over this period.   
 
Overall, we conclude that system usage variables: web site usage and changes in usage patterns, 
are good predictors of switching and attrition. Thus, for targeting consumers it is important to 
focus on system usage variables (particularly volume of usage and changes in usage patterns) to 
identify good customers.  Since the price of trading services substantially exceeds marginal cost 
and there is very little unpriced customer service activity, higher volume customers are typically   33 
more profitable.
13  Therefore, for example, it may be worthwhile to subsidize customers who 
show a high level of use at a competitor (since they face higher switching costs) rather than new 
adopters. Moreover, firms should pay extra attention to customers who showed changes in usage 
patterns since it can predict a tendency to switching.  Moreover, to the extent that systems usage 
encourages retention through system-specific learning, it would imply that firms could improve 
retention by encourage consumers to frequently visit and use their sites.  Our analysis also 
suggests that systems design characteristics such as personalization and ease of use should be 
reconsidered both in terms of their measurement and in further evaluating if they have the 
intended effects on long-term customer behavior. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Previous theoretical work has shown that the presence of switching costs, either generally or in 
specific firms, can have a substantial effect on profitability.  However, the creation of switching 
costs requires substantial and deliberate investments by the firm in customer retention.  In order 
to effectively manage customer retention it is important to have methods of measuring switching 
costs and understand the factors that influence them.  Only by understanding the magnitude of 
these switching costs could firms measure tradeoffs between investments in loyalty and retention 
programs and other types of investments such as advertising (for building new customer 
acquisition rates), technologies, and service level improvements or price reductions which raise 
both the acquisition and retention rates simultaneously.  This paper offers such a model for 
measuring switching costs and identifying the sources of switching costs. The study of the 
sources of switching costs is important for product and service design and technology adoption. 
The exploration of how systems design and systems usage variables affect retention gives us 
feedback on how to utilize these variables in shaping a firm’s strategy and how to adjust these 
investments in the future.  Our results also complement and extend previous work on IT adoption 
that has considered similar constructs. 
 
                                                 
13 This stands in contrast to other financial industries, such as banking, where transaction volume is typically 
associated with lower customer profitability.   34 
Applying our measurement model to the online brokerage industry, we found that implied 
switching costs vary substantially across brokers, and that system usage variables, like usage and 
change in usage, are useful in predicting customers’ switching behaviors. Our result also 
suggests that factors under the firm’s control may influence these switching costs.  Our initial 
analyses using firm attributes identifies some of these factors, but there is still substantial 
heterogeneity, suggesting that firms have significant control over their switching costs through 
various kinds of retention strategies. Although we do not find that system design variables like 
ease of use and personalization are associated with beneficial customer behavior in our data, this 
may simply reflect that these technologies have not yet matured, a hypothesis that can be 
explored in future research. 
 
The method and approach used by this paper is applicable to the analysis of other Internet-
enabled markets or industries. The method proposed here is especially suitable for the analysis of 
Internet businesses because we are able to observe all the products a customer considered and 
know for certain options that were available at the time the customer made an adoption choice.  
Using these approaches, firms can measure their switching costs – the first step to effectively 
managing them.  In addition, by linking the switching costs due to firm specific retention 
strategies to the implementation costs, managers can better gauge the effectiveness of retention 
investments.     35 
Figures: 
 
Figure 1: Graphical Research Model on Switching and Attrition (variables emphasized in 
previous IS research are italicized) 
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Figure 2: Customer flow diagram (sample period: Q3-99 to Q4-99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Customer flow rates 
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Figure 4a: Switching cost measure with 95% confidence interval without controlling for 
demographics  
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Figure 4b: Switching cost measure with 95% confidence interval after control for customer 
heterogeneity 
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Tables 
Table 1: Variables used in this study 
Variable name  Description or definitions  Code or measures 
IS variables 
Quality  Summary measurement of 
system and information quality 
regarding the web site 
Since customer confidence level is positively correlated with 
the level of system and information quality, we use the Gomez 
index on Customer Confidence as a measure of system and 
information quality. 
Higher value is related to higher customer confidence. 
Ease of use  Ease of use of the web site.  From Gomez index: ease of use.  
Higher value stands for easier to use. 
Personalization  The degree of web site 
personalization. 
From Gomez index: relationship services 
Higher value means higher degree of personalization. 
Web site usage  Web site usage by customers.   We measure web site usage by visiting frequency. Visiting 
frequency is measured by the number of days in a quarter a 
customer has visited the restricted pages (for account holders 
only) on the web site.
14 
Change in usage  Changes in visiting frequencies 
by a customer. 
Change in usage pattern is measured by the differences in usage 
(visiting frequency) between two periods divided by the former 
period’s usage, i.e.,  2. 1.
1.
period freq period freq
period freq
−  
Customer characteristics 
Age  Age of the customer  The age of the customer. 
Female (dummy)  Gender  Female=1 for female; Female=0 for male 
Hhsize  Number of people in the 
household 
Number of people in the household 
Race1, Race3 (two 
dummies) 
race  1=White, 3=Oriental, 4=Black and other. 
Hhinc  Household income  Household income 
Education  Education  1=Grade school, 2=some high school, 3=Graduated high 
school, 4=some college, 5=graduated college, 6=post graduate 
school  
Mktsize (four 
dummies) 
Market size- MSA  3=50,000--499,999; 4=500,000 999,999; 5=1,000,000-
2,499,999; 6=2,500,000 and over; 9=Non-MSA. 
Marital status (two 
dummies) 
Marital Status  1=married, 3=widowed or divorced or separate, 4=single. 
Occupation (five 
dummies) 
Occupation  1=Professional; 2=Proprietors, Managers, Officials; 4=Sales; 
5=Craftsmen, Foremen or operative; &=Retired, Unemployed; 
o=others. 
No. of brokers  Number of different brokers 
the user adopts 
This variable is used to capture the degree of a customer’s 
loyalty level or propensity of switching. Presumably, the more 
brokers a customer adopts, the more likely she would switch 
since the level of switching cost is lower.  
Firm attributes 
Resources  Breadth of offerings or product 
variety. 
From Gomez index: online resources 
Higher value represents more online resources. 
Cost  Overall cost level of the 
broker. 
From Gomez index: overall cost index 
Higher value indicates lower cost. 
Minimum deposit  Minimum deposit required to 
open an account. 
Measured in thousands. 
Broker dummies 
(ten dummies) 
Specific retention strategy 
controlled by firms.  
Broker dummies 
                                                 
14 Our measure of access (number of days visited) differs from traditional web site visit metrics such as visits or page views (see 
Alpar et al.,2001 for a discussion) because of the nature of online brokerage industry.  Most importantly, this industry differs 
from most other web sites in that revenue is earned principally through transaction fees rather than advertising.   39 
Table 2a: Estimated Switching Cost (various methods)  
  1 2 3  4  5 6 
  Q499 Q100 Q200 Pooled Regression 1  Regression 2 
AMERITRADE  4.64 3.89 3.93  4.15  4.07  (0.20)  3.97(0.22) 
DATEK  5.10 5.29 5.71  5.34  5.30  (0.34)  5.18 (0.37) 
DLJDIRECT  4.06 4.85 5.66  4.77  4.70  (0.27)  4.79(0.29) 
ETRADE  2.20 3.03 3.14  2.78  2.77  (0.12)  2.72 (0.13) 
FIDELITY  3.25 3.50 3.66  3.46  3.53  (0.13)  3.60(0.15) 
FLEET  5.01 5.16 5.42  5.19  5.29  (0.33)  5.49 (0.41) 
MSDW  4.56 5.87 5.03  5.11  5.22  (0.39)  5.26(0.47) 
NDB  na 7.11  7.62 7.27 7.36  (0.75)  8.80 (1.23) 
SCHWAB  3.97 4.25 4.21  4.13  4.05  (0.16)  4.02(0.18) 
TDWATERHOUSE 4.57 4.63 5.78  4.86  4.87  (0.23)  5.09 (0.27) 
VANGUARD  4.38 4.15 4.52  4.31  4.34  (0.23)  4.38(0.25) 
 
Columns 1-4 are ratio analysis-based measures 
Regression 1: switching cost measures without control for customer heterogeneity. Standard error in parenthesis. 
Regression 2: switching cost measures after control for customer heterogeneity. Standard error in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 2b: Adoption cost measures (baseline: Schwab) 
BROKER ESTIMATE  STD  ERROR 
AMERITRADE -0.576*  0.274 
DATEK -0.777*  0.389 
DLJDIRECT -0.042  0.320 
ETRADE 0.140  0.206 
FIDELITY -0.102  0.216 
FLEET -0.275  0.392 
MSDW 0.575  0.437 
NDB -1.638  1.082 
SCHWAB 0.025  0.306 
TDWATERHOUSE -0.414  0.287 
* - Significantly different from zero at P<0.05  40 
Table 3:  Predictors of Switching Behavior (negative is less switching) 
  REGRESSION 1  REGRESSION 2  REGRESSION 3 
 Intercept  -2.2375*** 
(0.550) 
-0.6148 
(1.180) 
-0.7803 
(1.572) 
 Age  -0.0091 
(0.005) 
-0.0080 
(0.005) 
-0.0070 
(0.005) 
 Female  0.0859 
(0.140) 
0.1142 
(0.142) 
0.1009 
(0.144) 
 Hhsize  
 
0.0282 
(0.056) 
0.0351 
(0.056) 
0.0282 
(0.057) 
 Race1 (white)  -0.1965 
(0.251) 
-0.2095 
(0.254) 
-0.1990 
(0.257) 
 Race3 (oriental)  0.3913 
(0.325) 
0.3159 
(0.329) 
0.4517 
(0.336) 
 Hhinc   -0.0015 
(0.002) 
0.0015 
(0.002) 
0.0017 
(0.002) 
 Education  -0.0813 
(0.065) 
-0.0823 
(0.065) 
-0.0859 
(0.066) 
 Mktsize  2 χ (4)=4.86 
P=0.30 
2 χ (4)=4.58 
P=0.33 
2 χ (4)=5.03 
P=0.28 
 Marital status  2 χ (2)=0.02 
P=0.99 
2 χ (2)=0.17 
P=0.92 
2 χ (2)=0.17 
P=0.92 
 Occupation  2 χ (5)=3.88 
P=0.57 
2 χ (5)=3.80 
P=0.58 
2 χ (5)=3.66 
P=0.60 
 Web site usage  -0.0783*** 
(0.010) 
-0.0779*** 
(0.011) 
-0.0748*** 
(0.010) 
 Change in Usage  0.0562*** 
(0.015) 
0.0563*** 
(0.016) 
0.0579*** 
(0.016) 
 No. of  brokers  1.0766*** 
(0.096) 
1.0742*** 
(0.097) 
1.0473*** 
(0.098) 
 Q100  -0.3845** 
(0.147) 
-0.407** 
(0.150) 
-0.3563* 
(0.155) 
 Q200  -0.4777** 
(0.151) 
-0.2611 
(0.191) 
-0.3066 
(0.194) 
 Ease of use    0.0989* 
(0.050) 
0.0231 
(0.072) 
 Quality    -0.1959* 
(0.096) 
-0.1658 
(0.100) 
 Resources    -0.0495 
(0.116) 
-0.4879*** 
(0.137) 
 Personalization  -0.1096 
(0.146) 
0.3227* 
(0.160) 
 Cost    0.00737 
(0.064) 
0.1559 
(0.095) 
 Minimum deposit    0.0568 
(0.071) 
 
 Broker dummies      2 χ (10)=35.8 
P<0.0001*** 
 N  2824  2824  2824 
2 χ   264.06***  278.09***  316.73*** 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  *- P<0.05 **- P<0.01 ***- P<0.001   41 
Table 4: Attrition analysis (negative is less attrition; baseline: Schwab) 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4 
 Intercept  1.4291*** 
(0.372) 
1.0916** 
(0.401) 
1.2518 
(0.939) 
1.1759 
(2.940) 
 Age  -0.0106*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0093** 
(0.003) 
-0.0091** 
(0.003) 
-0.00947** 
(0.003) 
 Female  0.2415** 
(0.089) 
0.2615** 
(0.090) 
0.2698** 
(0.090) 
0.2506** 
(0.090) 
 Education  -0.0901* 
(0.046) 
-0.0935* 
(0.046) 
-0.0910* 
(0.0.046) 
-0.0952* 
(0.046) 
 Occupation  2 χ (5)=10.75 
P=0.06 
2 χ (5)=10.45 
P=0.06 
2 χ (5)=11.55 
P=0.04* 
2 χ (2)=11.14 
P=0.05* 
 Web site usage  -0.2549*** 
(0.016) 
-0.2536*** 
(0.016) 
-0.2543*** 
(0.016) 
-0.2548*** 
(0.016) 
 No. of brokers  -0.2161 
(0.118) 
-0.2512* 
(0.121) 
-0.2361* 
(0.120) 
-0.2402* 
(0.121) 
 Q100  0.2110 
(0.110) 
0.2089 
(0.110) 
0.1451 
(0.112) 
0.1017 
(0.120) 
 Q200  1.1391*** 
(0.103) 
1.1355*** 
(0.103) 
1.0697*** 
(0.134) 
1.187*** 
(0.164) 
 Ease of use 
 
 0.1359*** 
(0.040) 
0.3462*** 
(0.080) 
 Quality 
 
 0.0525 
(0.066) 
-0.0396 
(0.104) 
 Resources 
 
 0.1126 
(0.083) 
-0.1391 
(0.186) 
 Personalization 
 
 0.0073 
(0.101) 
-0.00711 
(0.165) 
 Cost 
 
 -0.004 
(0.045) 
-0.2397 
(0.167) 
 Minimum deposit 
 
 -0.101* 
(0.047) 
 
 Ameritrade    0.4934** 
(0.188) 
 2.3448* 
(0.938) 
 Datek    0.0824 
(0.260) 
  1.4091 
(1.041) 
 DLJDirect    0.2554 
(0.231) 
  0.877 
(0.535) 
 E*Trade    0.5008*** 
(0.147) 
 1.0587* 
(0.461) 
 Fidelity    0.1303 
(0.140) 
  0.6848** 
(0.217) 
 Fleet    0.3517 
(0.268) 
 1.8843* 
(0.860) 
 MSDW    0.2669 
(0.381) 
 0.1476 
(0.803) 
 NDB    0.1965 
(0.351) 
 1.0515 
(0.633) 
 TDWaterhouse    0.099 
(0.204) 
 2.1112** 
(0.810) 
 Vanguard    0.3981* 
(0.18) 
 1.675 
(0.922) 
 N  3634  3634  3634  3634 
2 χ   1009.24***  1029.83***  1037.28***  1052.14*** 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  *- P<0.05 **- P<0.01 ***- P<0.001;  Some insignificant demographic variables omitted from 
table due to space considerations but included in the analysis (hhsize, race, hhinc, mktsize and marital status)     42 
Table 5:  Summary of hypothesis tests  
 
Hypotheses Test  result 
H1  There are no significant differences in measured switching cost 
across firms. 
Not supported 
(P<0.0001) 
H2  There are no significant differences in measured switching cost 
across firms after controlling for customer characteristics. 
Not supported 
(P<0.0001) 
H3a  Use of multiple brokers is positively correlated with switching.    Supported 
H3b  Changes in usage patterns are positively correlated with switching  Supported  
H3c  High volume of web site usage is negatively correlated with 
switching.   
Supported 
H4a  Switching is negatively correlated with personalization.  Not supported 
H4b  Switching is positively correlated with ease of use.  Supported  
H4c  Switching is negatively correlated with quality.    Supported  
H4d  Switching is negatively correlated with breadth of offerings.    Supported  
H4e  Switching is not related to cost.    Supported  
H5a  Use of multiple brokers is negatively correlated with attrition.    Supported 
H5b  High volume of web site usage is negatively correlated with 
attrition. 
Supported 
H6a  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with personalization.    Not supported  
H6b  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with quality.  Not supported 
H6c Customer attrition is negatively correlated with breadth of 
offerings. 
Not supported 
H6d  Customer attrition is negatively correlated with ease of use.  Not supported 
H6e  Customer attrition is not related to cost.    Supported 
H6f Customer attrition is negatively correlated with account 
minimums. 
Supported  
   43 
Table 6:  Summary of factors that affect acquisition, switching and attrition (Model 
includes broker characteristics, customer characteristics and time controls) 
 
*: p<0.05  **:  p<0.01  ***:  p<0.001 
 
We have altered the signs of the coefficients such that “+” is good, and “-” is bad; a factor is coded “NS” if it is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Note that many factors in the acquisition model are insignificant due to the large number of demographic control 
variables interacted with firm dummy variables (this an inherent problem with using conditional logit analysis to 
investigate individual-level effects).  When individual effects are not included, the remaining firm factors (cost, ease 
of use, quality, personalization) are all positive and significant, as would be expected. 
 
 
Acquisition Switching Attrition
Cost NS NS NS
Ease of Use NS -* -***
Quality NS +* NS
Resources +*** +*** NS
Personalization NS NS NS
Minimum Deposit -** NS +*
Web Site Usage varied +*** +***
Change in Usage na -*** n/a
Multiple Brokers varied -*** +*
Demographics varied minimal Age (+**)
Women (-**)
Education (+*)
Overall Fit χ2(186)=1430 χ2(29)=278 χ2(28)=1031
Model Conditional logit Logisitic Logisitic  44 
Appendix:  Definitions of Gomez Indexes (quote from Gomez Advisors web site) 
 
1. Ease of Use: The Web site of a top firm in this category boasts a consistent and intuitive layout with tightly 
integrated content and functionality, useful demos and extensive online help. Roughly 30 to 50 criteria points are 
assessed, including:  
•  Demonstrations of functionality.  
•  Simplicity of account opening and transaction process.  
•  Consistency of design and navigation.  
•  Adherence to proper user interaction principles.  
•  Integration of data providing efficient access to information commonly accessed by consumers.  
2. Customer Confidence: The leaders in this category operate highly reliable Web sites, maintain knowledgeable 
and accessible customer service organizations, and provide quality and security guarantees. Roughly 30 to 50 
criteria points are assessed, including:  
•  Availability, depth, and breadth of customer service options, including phone, e-mail, and branch locations.  
•  Ability to accurately and readily resolve a battery of telephone calls and e-mails sent to customer service, 
covering simple technical and industry-specific questions.  
•  Privacy policies, service guarantees, fees, and explanations of fees.  
•  Each ranked Web site is monitored every five minutes, seven days a week, 24 hours a day for speed and 
reliability of both public and secure (if available) areas.  
•  Financial strength, technological capabilities and independence, years in business, years online, and 
membership organizations.  
3. On-Site Resources: The top firms in this category not only bring a wide range of products, services and 
information onto the Web, but also provide depth to these products and services through a full range of electronic 
account forms, transactions, tools and information look-up. Roughly 30 to 50 criteria points are assessed, including:  
•  Availability of specific products.  
•  Ability to transact in each product online.  
•  Ability to seek service requests online.  
4. Relationship Services: Firms build electronic relationships through personalization, by enabling customers to 
make service requests and inquiries online and through programs and perks that build customer loyalty and a sense 
of community. Roughly 30 to 50 criteria points are assessed, including:  
•  Online help, tutorials, glossary and FAQs.  
•  Advice.  
•  Personalization of data.  
•  Ability to customize a site.  
•  Re-use of customer data to facilitate future transactions.  
•  Support of business and personal needs such as tax reporting or repeated-buying.  
•  Frequent buyer incentives.  
5. Overall Cost: Gómez looks at the total cost of ownership for a typical basket of services customized for each 
customer profile. Costs include:  
1.  A basket of typical services and purchases.  
2.  Added fees due to shipping and handling.  
3.  Minimum balances.  
4.  Interest rates.    45 
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